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ABSTRACT
With the success of Web applications, most of our data is
now stored on various third-party servers where they are pro-
cessed to deliver personalized services. Naturally we must
be authenticated to access this personal information, but
the use of personalized services only restricted by identifi-
cation could indirectly and silently leak sensitive data. We
analyzed Google Web Search access mechanisms and found
that the current policy applied to session cookies could be
used to retrieve users’ personal data. We describe an at-
tack scheme leveraging the search personalization (based on
the same sid cookie) to retrieve a part of the victim’s click
history and even some of her contacts. We implemented a
proof of concept of this attack on Firefox and Chrome Web
browsers and conducted an experiment with ten volunteers.
Thanks to this prototype we were able to recover up to 80%
of the user’s search click history.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, Google’s core service “Search” was
enhanced through feature deployments, new UI and display
optimization. One major improvement regarding the qual-
ity of search results was the personalization of the ranking
algorithms. Personalized search results are ranked according
to the user’s context (i.e. localization and language), profile
(search history), social networks and other characteristics
extracted from the use of Google’s services. Via the Google
Dashboard, users can view and possibly edit data that was
collected by their use of Google services. These data may be
very sensitive, so access to this interface naturally requires
an authentication.
However, while the direct access to users’ data is sub-
ject to a strict security policy, using personalized services
(which may leak this same personal information) is not. In-
deed, some Web applications like Google Search only verify
the (unsecured) user’s session to render personalization fea-
tures. Such a session can be hijacked by simply capturing
the corresponding “sid cookie”. Unlike cookies used to au-
thenticate the user, the sid cookie may be sent cleartext,
i.e. unprotected. Furthermore, this cookie is sent when-
ever the user accesses to a service hosted on google.com,
increasing attack opportunities. In this paper we show how
the sid cookie could be misused by an attacker, providing
ungranted access to Google Search personalized results and
history.
We study an information leakage attack that exploits
the current Google’s access policy regarding personalized
services (i.e. unauthenticated access). More specifically,
we hijack a sid cookie to circumvent Google protection and
access a user’s personal data who — possibly forced by the
attacker — transmitted her cookie in clear text. We empha-
size the risk of using unauthenticated personalized services
over a shared network with the following contributions.
1. The description of an information leakage attack that
uses the unprotected sid cookie to retrieve the victim’s
visited search results and a list of her contacts.
2. A proof of concept, based on the browser extension
“Firesheep”, and the tool we used to evaluate the im-
pact of the information leakage.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes Google’s architecture and services relevant to the
understanding of the proposed attacks. Section 3 presents
the information leakage attack using the sid cookie to re-
trieves user’s click history and contacts. An implementation
of this attack is proposed in Section 4 along with statis-
tics showing how seriously a Google account’s click history
could be compromised. Finally section 5 discusses measures
that should be deployed to counter this attack and section
6 concludes this paper.
2. GOOGLE SERVICES AND COOKIES
Google provides more than twenty different services, cov-
ering most of people needs over the Web. With a single
Google account, a user can access to all these applications
even those hosted on different domains (e.g. YouTube or
Blogger). A couple of cookies are used to help users navi-
gating smoothly between the Google services.
2.1 Google.com cookies
At least three cookies are systematically sent by the
user’s browser to Google servers when accessing a service
under the google.com domain.
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• pref: this cookie carries the preferences for the browser
currently accessing the service. These preferences re-
fer to the interface, the language, the number of results
returned by a search, etc. The pref cookie is attached
to a browser and not bound to a specific user account.
• sid: this non-secured session cookie is transmitted to
Google servers to identify the user and personalize the
provided services. In the particular case of Search, this
identification will trigger result personalization. Even
if the user is not logged, best effort personalization of
search results can be performed based on the recent
browser activity.
• ssid: this secured session cookie provides access to ser-
vices that contains user data and personal information
like Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Contacts, etc.
It is our understanding that unlike the ssid cookie, the sid
cookie just has an identification purpose and can not be used
to authenticate a user. On the other hand, the ssid cookie is
sent only over encrypted connections and is required for ser-
vices providing access to users’ data and personal informa-
tion. Google is thus implementing a two-level cookie based
access policy; the first level only requires user identification
while accessing to the second level assumes user authentica-
tion.
In our study, we focus on the sid cookie and the infor-
mation leakage that results of subsequent service personal-
ization.
2.2 Setting up the Attack
The sid cookie is valid over the entire (*.google.com) do-
main, so it is sent to every Web application hosted on Google
(*.google.com). Some services, such as Gmail, are only
available via a secured https connection, whereas others
can be accessed through clear connection (http) that is the
case of Google Search and other services listed in Table 1.
The sid cookie is sent every time a request to a ser-
vice under the (google.com) domain is sent, even when the
queried page cannot be personalized (e.g: privacy policy,
terms of services). Because this cookie is sent to many urls,
it is enough for one of these urls not to be accessible through
https to be able to compromise it.
2.2.1 Bypassing HTTPS enforcement policy
HTTPS-Everywhere [3] is a browser extension that, when
available, redirects a user to the secured version of the re-
quested service to prevent traffic interception. Unfortu-
nately this approach suffers from several drawbacks:
• First, not every service is yet available through https.
For instance, Google Alerts remains only accessible
through http.
• Second, the list of services available through https has
to be maintained. Some services are already available
in https but not yet redirected. A list of such services
is reported in Table 1.
• Finally, some services are redirected while not yet avail-
able. As a result these services can not be reached by
HTTPS-Everywhere users.
Due to these flaws, even HTTPS-Everywhere users could be
redirected to a URL where they would have to send their
sid cookies in cleartext.
2.2.2 Intercepting the sid cookie
Whenever a user accesses to one of the listed URL, her vul-
nerable sid cookie is exposed and so is her personal informa-
tion. The objective of the attacker is to force the victim to
exchange this cookie with unsecured services over a shared
network, and so easily capture the cookie. Here are some
examples.
• The attacker can setup an open access point with a
name (ssid) corresponding to a local hot-spot (e.g.
fast-food restaurant name) and include in the welcome
page an hidden iframe pointing to an unsecured Google
service. When connected, the browser will send to the
rogue access point the valid sid cookie in clear text.
• In an open wireless network, the attacker could also
spoof the access point’s physical address (mac) and
respond to a victim’s http get request by any Web
page including the hidden iframe just like in the pre-
vious case.
2.2.3 Googling for Cookies
The simpler solution to find SID cookies is to search them.
Typing the query“pref=id= sid= google’ ’ in Google provides
a list of pages where people published captured HTTP traf-
fic, including SID cookies. Using the “Past Month” search
filter increases the chances of retrieving valid SID cookies.
Not all these results contain full SID cookies and some of
the listed SID cookies may have already expired, but this
simple search should already provide many valid cookies.
3. PERSONALIZED SEARCH ATTACK
The search results provided to users who enabled Google
Web Search History are personalized and colored based on
their previous interactions. One advantage of this feature is
the ability to see the websites a user previously visited in
the Google’s search results. Furthermore, frequently visited
pages are more likely to be high ranked. In 2009, Google also
started to consider social network indicators as part of the
inputs used to improve the search algorithm. “Social Search”
now up-ranks results that user’s contacts shared publicly via
Google Buzz, Twitter and other social networks.
The personalized search algorithm is based on private
data held in the user’s account. As such, it can be considered
as a controlled information leakage. In [2], authors suggest
that this information leakage can be used to know some of
the results a user clicked on. This flaw has not yet been fixed
as considered hard to exploit: an attacker must know what
the victim searched for and then compare the personalized
and un-personalized results. Similarly, the visited-link col-
oration feature/vulnerability [2] was not addressed as con-
sidered innocuous regarding the benefits it offered.
However, since these flaws have been reported, Google
introduced new features that could improve the efficiency
of attacks based on this information leakage. This section
shows how these features could be misused to compromise
users’ click history.
URL not available in HTTPS URL not redirected to HHTPS
Specialties Services Specialties Services
google.com/blogsearch picasa.google.com google.com/sitesearch investor.google.com
google.com/dirhp maps.google.com google.com/transparencyreport desktop.google.com
google.com/alerts knol.google.com/k google.com/adsense/support
google.com/mobile webaccelerator.google.com google.com/insights/search
google.com/nexus sketchup.google.com google.com/prdhp
google.com/analytics books.google.com google.com/appsstatus
google.com/postini video.google.com google.com/chromebook
google.com/chrome scholar.google.com google.com/patents
google.com/wallet gears.google.com
google.com/ads/preference
google.com/baraza
google.com/imghp
Table 1: List of URLs that require the victim to send cleartext her cookie
3.1 Google Search filters
In this section we list the features that made the informa-
tion leakage attack more critical. These features – available
when clicking on “ Show search tools” – could be misused to
significantly reduce the number of queries one has to issue to
retrieve the previously clicked search results (and so harder
to detect).
3.1.1 Visited Results
Collecting a user’s visited links via random regular searches
may take a very long time as the result pages mix visited
and unvisited hyperlinks. However, an update of the Google
Search interface introduced new filters. For instance, the
“Visited” one filters out unvisited results 1. By enabling this
filter, the information leakage becomes critical: only visited
links remain listed as search results, partly disclosing the
user’s click history.
3.1.2 Social
With the “Social” filter, pages commented, twitted or shared
via a social platform are displayed. The user’s social net-
work is built up according to his Gmail contacts and pos-
sibly other social applications such as Twitter, Livejournal,
etc (once linked to his Google account). This filter does not
only provide the list of shared links, but also the connections
that exist between the user and his social peers. Moreover,
the user’s Gmail contacts that should be treated as strictly
private data is exposed and so could be used for blackmail-
ing, phishing or spamming attacks. While we did not inves-
tigated how many contacts this attack may compromise, it
appears that people who share a lot of information or belong
to a large social network, are very likely to be listed in the
“Social” search result page.
In addition to the list of Gmail contact, Google+ users
will also receive links that have been shared by people in
their Circles whether or not these contacts belong to ex-
posed Circles. Consequently, information about the victim
private Circles could also be leaked and retrieved through
the “Social” filter.
3.2 Capturing the victim’s data
The sole prerequisite to run this attack is to capture the
sid cookie of a user with Web Search History enabled. sid
1To visit the result page containing only
visited links, one can directly go to
http://www.google.com/search?q=.com&tbo=1&tbs=whv:1
cookies are not marked “secured” and so are usually sent
cleartext. If the victim uses a secure connection (https),
the attacker could use the iframe injection described in Sec-
tion 2 to force her to send the sid cookie cleartext. Once
the cookie has been intercepted, the attack is launched by
opening a window on Google Search with the “Visited” filter
enabled.
To start the attack, we use a list of 15 terms composed
of domain extension (.com, .net, .org,.us,.edu,.fr,.co.),
words and acronyms likely to appear in urls (.jsp, .asp,
php, html, index, www) and popular websites (google, facebook).
To maximize the chance of finding all the visited links, the
program should not only parse the first page of results, but
browse all of them. We implemented a prototype that parses
the result page and then clicks on “Next” to display and
parse the following and so on until the last page. With
Google Instant disabled – the attacker can set his Google
pref cookie to display 100 results per page instead of 10.
Because the pref cookie is browser specific – and not linked
to the currently used Google Account – the attacker search
preferences won’t be mirrored on the victim browser. The
list of retrievable clicked URLs can therefore be browsed
very quickly. However, this attack is destructive; as the pro-
gram interacts with the result pages, queries entered during
the attack will appear in the victim’s Web Search History.
We conducted an experiment we analyze in section 4
and which shows that on average, 40% of the click history
can be retrieved. For Google users who search only occa-
sionally from their account, up to 80% of the click history
could be retrieved using this method.
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In order to validate the applicability of our attack and to
illustrate its easy deployment, we implemented a proof of
concept as a Firefox extension and another extension to
measure the number of visited links that were retrievable.
Both tools are available online (see http://unsearcher.
org/sid-test) and we describe them in this section. We
then detail and analyze our experiment results.
A chrome extension has also been developped to quickly set
the SID cookie for the google.com domain (this extension
is also available online http://unsearcher.org)
4.1 Extending Firesheep
In October 2010, the Firefox extension Firesheep [1] was re-
leased and emphasized the simplicity of session hijacking.
This extension monitors network interfaces to capture cook-
ies corresponding to sessions established on popular Web
Service websites like Facebook, Google and Twitter. Once
a cookie is captured, the extension provides an access to the
account related to the hijacked session.
We extended Firesheep to implement our information
leakage attack. Thanks to the Firehseep modularity, we eas-
ily added a module that performs the attack on the session
hijacked by the original code.
As a result, when a Google sid cookie is captured, the
account name appears in the Firesheep sidebar. Double
clicking on it starts the attack; double clicking again dis-
plays the retrieved list of visited links.
4.2 Measurement methodology
We asked ten users to run the experiment on their
Google accounts, we provided them with an extension that
extracts from a user Web Search History the clicks recorded
since 1st January 2011 and then issues some queries from
the user’s account with the “Visited” filter activated. The
extension — developed for this experiment — and the cor-
responding instructions have been publicly released2 to let
users evaluate which portion of their click history can be
exposed. Notice that, in order to preserve privacy of our
testers, we asked them to send us only the ratio of clicks the
attack was able to retrieve.
It is worth noticing that, among the 10 volunteers who
all had Web Search History enabled, 6 were not aware that
the service existed and never used it (on purpose). It has
been estimated that 50% of Google accounts have Web Search
History enabled [2], but many may not be aware that the
service is enabled, as the opt-out option has not always been
obvious [5].
4.3 Result Analysis
We summarize the results of our experiments in Table 2.We
simulated the attack on a set of ten volunteers who visited
between 88 and 3059 search results between January and
July 2011. For these users, between 72 and 467 links were
retrieved counting for 82% to 11% of the links recorded in
their Web Search History over the considered period. We
also recorded the total number of links that the attack re-
trieved independently of the date they were visited.
The attack provides similar results for the three users
with the more visited links in their search history. For these
three users who visited more links (Users 8, 9 and 10 ), a
similar number of visited links were retrieved (between 628
and 644) although the number of clicks in the Web Search
History varies from 1340 to 3059.
Figure 1 depicts the ratio of retrieved query as a func-
tion of the number of query submitted. We decided to use
suffix and file extensions in our query list as they are very
likely to appear in the URL of visited links and should re-
turn many search results. For instance, the query “.com”
will return the list of visited links with the “.com” suffix.
The objective is to recover a large portion of the vic-
tim’s visited search results with the smallest set of search
queries. Limiting the number of queries that will appear in
the Web Search History reduces the risk that the victim de-
tects the attack. A detected attack is likely to result in the
purge of the victim’s Web Search History and would prevent
2The extension is available at http://unsearcher.org/
Test%20Flaw/ad@monitor.xpi
any further exploitation of the sid cookie by the attacker.
Four queries — with no associated visited search results
— are likely to remain unnoticed in victims’ Web Search His-
tory and are enough to retrieve a large part of the clicked
results. For all users, the attack submitted the 15 queries in
less than 5 minutes.
Figure 1: Destructive Approach: Result for the 10
users
5. COUNTERMEASURE
The information leakage attack we described just require
to read victims’ sid cookies. If a user is not logged on her
Google account when she accesses to Google services from a
shared network, her sid cookie can not be compromised. A
solution is therefore to sign out from Google accounts when
connecting from a shared network or to use a vpn to encrypt
the traffic and prevent cookie interception.
From a user perspective a solution to prevent this sec-
ond attack is to purge the Web Search History and to disable
temporarily this feature. Such radical solution would defi-
nitely prevent the leakage of information about the user’s
search history but would not prevent a list of Gmail and
Google+ contacts to be exposed by “Social Search”.
Another solution is to disable the “visited” and “social”
search filters when a user is not visiting the secured version
of Google. While this – most likely –temporary solution
does not fist the information leakage, it makes its exploita-
tion more complicated and detectable.
6. CONCLUSION
We presented an information leakage attack that leverages
Google two-level cookie based access policy. We described an
information leakage attack, implemented a proof of concept
and evaluated the number of links visited over the last six
months that could be exposed. Both issues should soon be
fixed and we describe measures users could take to protect
their search history from this kind of attack.
Nevertheless, some issues can not be addressed by users
and require a modification of Google’s cookie policy. As
Google is taking steps to include social indicators in result
personalization, user’s social network could soon be exposed.
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